



































Introduction: Explanation and Theory Structure

Structuralism is evidently a way, or style, of reconstructing scientific theories. Structuralism therefore presupposes that there are scientific theories already in existence that there are not normally expressed in the canonical style – otherwise there would be no reconstructing work to do. These remarks are surely obvious, but are nevertheless worth making because they direct our attention to questions about the purposes and aims of reconstruction: if theories are not normally cast in the recommended form, why do so? In a paper that is intended to 'reflect on' structuralism, such questions are important. So let us ask first what is to be gained by re-expressing scientific theories, for instance in set-theoretical terms?​[1]​

The answer is clearly not ease of use for the practitioner: it is obviously easier for a scientist to use particle mechanics in its usual textbook formulations than in the form in which it appears in An Architectonic for Science (Balzer, Moulines and Sneed 1987, hereafter BMS). This is not to say that practising scientists would never be interested in structuralist reconstructions of their theories, but rather that these would not enter into their everyday work. Again these comments are quite uncontroversial and we can all agree that reconstructions are employed for foundational or philosophical, rather than for purely scientific, reasons (while being careful not to commit ourselves to a sharp divide between these two sorts of concern). There is a similar kind of difference of interest between mathematicians on the one hand and philosophers of mathematics and logicians on the other. The latter see consistency and completeness as cardinal virtues of theories of mathematics and consequently reconstructions of those theories have taken the form which is most helpful from that perspective, for instance in first-order logic, while a theory reconstructed in such way would greatly encumber the practising mathematician.​[2]​ 

The main interest of the philosopher of science with regard to scientific theories is more prosaic: it is know just what a scientific theory is and what it does. Indeed, the very idea that all theories should, ideally, be expressible in first-order language was a considerable hindrance to answering these particular questions. Thus, the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of doing this for theories of science, something noted at the very outset by Suppes and echoed by structuralists ever since, misled philosophers of science for many years, especially those committed to empiricism.​[3]​ The resulting paradigm caricatured theories as deductive systems comprising axioms expressed by means of a vocabulary of theoretical terms whose 'meaning' somehow filtered up from observational sentences appearing as low-level theorems. Structuralism gives us a completely different answer to this question  - or rather answers, as there has been some change and development in the structuralist positions over the past twenty years. We can take Moulines' statement in a recent publication as the current position (Moulines 1996: 7-8). A theory T is a cultural object that can be identified with reference to its underlying 'structure', namely a set-theoretical object known as its core: K := <Mp, M, Mpp, C, L, A>, where Mp, M, Mpp are, respectively, the sets of potential, full and partial potential models of T, C is the set of constraints, L the set of links and A the class of admissible blurs.​[4]​ I assume that the reader is familiar with these ideas. 

Moulines' essay also contains some general remarks about structuralism; for instance, he says that structuralism is a theory about science in the sense that it is a theory about scientific theories (Moulines 1996: 2). Naturally, the first thing a theory about scientific theories has to do is to say what a scientific theory is. Structuralism does this by means of reconstruction, as we have just seen. But this is not the only way to do so. We could say, perhaps after reading the General Scholium of the Principia, that a theory is a unified collection of law statements together with some definitions. But this does not tell us what is special about theoretical functions, and it overlooks constraints and links (and also blurs). If the structuralist view is correct, then all these things must be implicit in Newton's presentation and in order to make them explicit, structuralism maintains that it is necessary to reconstruct scientific theories. To demonstrate that this approach is indeed the right one, it is necessary to show that scientific theories can be reconstructed in the approved manner - that they do in fact introduce their own special functions that serve to pick out a particular class of partial potential models, and so forth. Structuralism has had success in this direction, in many fields of science. But Moulines sees structuralism as doing more than this. He sees it as having two main purposes: the one just mentioned, and also to "clarify some general epistemological, methodological and metatheoretical questions about science" (Moulines 1996: 1). Just how a theory explains is clearly a 'general epistemological and methodological question'. 

A theory about scientific theories that has no implications for the nature of scientific explanation would be unacceptable, granted the present consensus that scientific theories do explain. This is because a theory about scientific theories must show how a theory 'bears upon' the data, or whatever the theory is supposed to be about. If we agree, for the moment, to call the explananda of a theory its data, then the explanations which it provides are going to be constituted by the way in which it bears on its data. This was true of the previous paradigm, in which explanations were held to be deductive arguments. Nothing more was required for scientific explanation, on the D-N model at least, other than the deduction of the explanandum from an explanans containing law statements. Hempel and others did, however, devote a great deal of effort to saying just what a law statement is and to justifying the idea that arguments conforming to the model counted as explanations. Hempel's justification was that D-N explanations are such that the explanans provides 'rational expectability' with regard to the explanandum and that, he believed, amounted to its explanation. It did so because he thought that rational (or nomic) expectability was equivalent to understanding, and thence to the notorious equivalence thesis that all explanations are potentially predictive.​[5]​

According to structuralism, the relationship between a theory and its data constitutes the empirical claim of the theory, the claim that what the theory is supposed to be about, its intended domain of application I, is a member of its content Cn(K), where the latter is a distinguished subset of the power set of Mpp. Cn(K) is distinguished in the sense that it comprises all and only those 'data sets' that satisfy the laws, constraints and links of T, to the degree of precision laid down by A. In the normal course of events, T's data will refer to individual states of affairs, not the whole of I, and the focus will be on particular models x  Mpp. If values of the theoretical functions for T can be assigned to the objects contained in the domain(s) of x to the degree of precision specified by A in such a way that the constraints and links are satisfied, then x is shown to be a member of a distinguished class of potential models of T. The issue about explanation and structuralism then comes down to this question: why is it that this explains x, or rather, why does it explain the state of affairs represented by x? 





There is,  I think, very little that can be done to retrieve the D-N model, or deductivist notions of explanation in general, so I agree that this is no longer an approach to explanation that we need to consider. However, Bartelborth dismisses the causal approach much too quickly (Bartelborth 1996: 25-27). It is true, as he says, that it has not been easy to give an informative account of causality, but following Salmon's lead there has, in the past twenty years, been great progress.​[7]​ Moreover, while it is also true that not all scientific explanations are causal explanations, some most certainly are.​[8]​ A question of the form "How did x come about?", a form that has innumerable instantiations in science, surely asks for a cause. One of the most important lessons to be learnt from work on explanation since the deductivist approach was first challenged is that there is no one single account of scientific explanation that covers all bona fide examples.​[9]​ Causal explanation is one important kind. Before asking about other kinds of scientific explanation, we should see whether structuralism can provide a basis for or in some way inform a causal account.

There are, I have suggested, many different causal explanations in science. Here we can use quantitative causal explanations as the main example, as much of the emphasis of structuralism has been on theories of physics. So, if a system b exhibits a quantity q to a given degree, such that a certain value q(b) of a variable which represents that quantity is attributed to that system, we can ask how this came about. We can ask what is responsible for b having q(b) as its q-value. Suppose that s underwent an interaction such that an influence p(b) was felt by the system and that there is a lawful relationship between q and p such that we can calculate that a system antecendently in the same state as b was would thereafter be in a state such that its q-value would be q(b). If this is then translated into the language of causes, it can be said that p(b) caused b to have the q-value q(b). More might well need to be said, or assumed, here for this to be a proper causal explanation. But in outline it is surely acceptable. And moreover it enables us to begin to understand how and why b has q(b).

The very first theory that received a structuralist reconstruction was classical particle mechanics, CPM, (Sneed 1971: Chapter 6). Sneed began with an axiomatisation of particle kinematics, which became the partial potential models for the theory. The theory had two theoretical functions, mass and force, and laws showing how these were related to kinematical quantities. In the previous example, then, suppose q(b) is the velocity of a particle and p(b) a force impressed on that particle. This state of affairs can be presented by a partial potential model and a model for CPM, assuming there are suitable values for the other relevant variables. This is what we would expect because the casual explanation of the state of s must be in accordance with the laws of the theory, because this is a quantitative explanation. It is not enough to say that s is in the state that it is in fact in because of the action of some force. The action of the force must be properly worked out and expressed in quantitative terms, and that is why the state of affairs can be represented by models of CPM, otherwise CPM would not be relevant at all. 

It might be said that the reconstruction of CPM is not relevant at all here, for all that is needed are the force laws. In particular, the 'structure' of CPM which is revealed by the reconstruction appears to play no role in the explanation. But this is not true. What the reconstruction does is to identify the theoretical functions of the theory and it is one of these, force, that is the cause. It is necessary to interpret these functions as real physical quantities or magnitudes if they are to be causes, and not everyone would agree to do so.​[10]​ This suggests the following conjecture: in causal explanations given by theories in physical science, causes are represented by theoretical functions, interpreted as designating real quantities. If this is correct, it may support a methodological directive to construct causal explanations with reference to theoretical functions. And what this shows is that structuralist reconstructions are not irrelevant to causal explanation. But is the conjecture correct?

In the first place it does not claim that all theoretical functions represent causes. Immediately we can see this because mass, the other CPM-theoretical function, is not the cause of a particle's motion. The role of the mass of a particle in a causal explanation is, of course, in the specification of the antecedent state, namely its previous momentum. It will therefore be necessary to decide which theoretical functions represent  causes. The example of CPM seems to suggest that it is those functions whose values are not subject to constraint. Thus, intuitively, the mass of system s must be the same in all models of the theory while the forces acting on it can change. The methodological directive might then be amended so as to direct our attention to unconstrained theoretical functions. 

Unfortunately there are theories which are such that none of their theoretical functions seem to represent causes. This appears to be true of the second theory of physics to have been given a structuralist reconstruction, classical thermodynamics, referred to as SETH in BMS. In that theory, energy and entropy are the theoretical functions while volume and mole number are non-theoretical. I think it is clear that it is not possible to give a causal explanation of why a given amount of gas occupies a certain volume by reference to its energy or to its entropy (or to both). The causal explanation, which is evidently not a scientific explanation, is simply that that is the amount of the gas the experimentalist chose to put into his container which itself has a fixed volume. This is not, however, some kind of failure on the part of structuralism, or a counter-example to our conjecture. SETH does not deal in causal explanations, and in fact BMS calling the theory equilibrium thermodynamics is entirely appropriate because it is about the conditions for equilibrium and not about how systems reach equilibrium. This leaves open the question as to whether classical thermodynamics can provide any other kinds of explanation.​[11]​ 

Our conjecture about the role of theoretical functions in causal explanations does not therefore inform an 'autonomous' methodological directive for finding causal explanations. It is necessary to have some reason to suppose that a particular theory will give causal explanations, perhaps from an informal pre-reconstructed version, before examining the reconstructed version. In particular, we should see whether the theory introduces any time dependence for the states of affairs which it represents. Causes are traditionally held to precede their effects, so a theory that has no counterpart for what have been called laws of succession will not yield causal explanations. Even if they do, this is no guarantee that it will be possible to find such explanations, as quantum mechanics attests. It is well-known that quantum mechanics has presented philosophers with an interest in issues such as realism and explanation with very considerable problems. These problems are at their most acute for causal accounts of science, since the theory does not appear to respect desiderata for causal explanations such as the continuity and contiguity of cause and effect. 





This account of explanation holds that something is explained when it is 'unified', when it is shown to belong to some 'system'. The idea that we understand more when we have fewer items of knowledge that we have to accept independently of one another was proposed by Friedman, who then suggested a deductivist analysis of systematisation. There is immediately a problem of spurious systematisation, for if I form the conjunction of the sentences which state everything that I know, then I have to 'accept' only one sentence. But if I come to know something else, then it is hardly the case that I understand or explain it to myself by conjoining it to my one big sentence.​[12]​ It is perhaps worth noting that there was a similar problem with D-N 'explanations' such as "This is black because it is a raven and all ravens are black". Systematisation is therefore not sufficient for explanation and if it is claimed that a particular sort of systematisation constitutes explanation, we require some justification. 

Bartelborth's own very thorough analysis of the sorts of unification that can be achieved on the basis of a structuralist reconstruction of a theory, hence demonstrating the unifying power of a theory, does contain such a justification, which I shall now consider. The sorts of unification Bartelborth has in mind he refers to as "embeddings", and they are embeddings of an explanandum E, appropriately conceived, in a model. Bartelborth is aware at the outset of the problem of spurious systematisation, for he writes "not every instance of embedding is explanatory" (Bartelborth 1996: 31). I take this to mean that not any embedding of an explanandum in any model is explanatory. However, as we would expect, explananda are to be construed as members of Mpp and the embedding models as members of M for some suitable theory T. Once this has been done, further dimensions of unification can be realised by further embeddings: in theory-nets as well as theory-elements, in specialisations, in constraints, etc. 

Having outlined his account of models and embeddings, Bartelborth says "In order to be unificatory and thereby explanatory, theories [have to be] more than just arbitrary conjunctions of laws...accepted theories exhibit a certain organic unity that arbitrary sets of sentences lack" (Bartelborth 1996: 35). He then goes on the propose a way in which to express this idea of 'organic unity' in structuralist language. He does this by defining a class of embedding functions, functions from Mpp to Mp, and formulating various empirical claims in terms of these functions. In this way he is able to state what it is for the empirical claim of a theory to be 'decomposable', namely resolvable into a conjunction of essentially independent subclaims (Bartelborth 1996: 37-38). If a claim is decomposable into two or more parts or subclaims, then there is a corresponding loss of unification and explanatory power. Bartelborth does not, however, then require that a theory have 'organic unity' in the sense that it has no such decomposition of its empirical claim, but rather that "we want a theory to have as few as possible" (Bartelborth 1996: 38). If T has a few, or 'quite a few', then presumably it will have less explanatory power, because it is less 'unificatory' than it would otherwise be. However, a prior question is why the theory should have any explanatory power at all: if E can be embedded in x Mpp which is in turn embedded in a model for T, and then further embedded in specialisations, etc., why does this explain E?

Suppose we interpret T instrumentally in the sense that its theoretical functions are not taken to refer to any real properties. Force and mass in CPM, entropy and energy in SETH, etc., are then just calculating devices, whose role is precisely to unify various kinds of phenomena by showing that values can be consistently assigned to them. In which case it seems that there is no explanation-seeking question that can answered by T, nor could T provide any understanding of the phenomena it unifies. For instance, if on asking why body b changes its velocity at a particular time and in a particular way, suppose we are told that it is possible to assign values of the functions f and m to b so that it is possible to calculate these changes in observable quantities in such a way as to be consistent with a whole range of other such assignments. I think we will concede that some sort of unification has been achieved, but surely this is not explanation and surely we have not understood why b changed its 'observable properties'. Similarly, if we are told that values of u and s can be consistently assigned to a sample of n moles of gas that occupies volume v(n), this will not explain the equilibrium condition for the gas if these quantities are just calculating devices. None of which is to say that the systematisations could have no point or purpose. For instance it would result in great economy of description and belief, such as Friedman admired, and which many empiricists like Mach, Kirchoff, Hertz and Duhem saw as the aim of science. I do not see anything in Bartelborth's account that rules out an instrumentalist reading of T, and indeed organic unity in his sense would certainly be prized by the instrumentalist. 

What I think is needed is something that I have argued for elsewhere, that we interpret the theoretical functions of T realistically here as well and take the material or 'proper' axioms of the theory to designate laws of nature.​[13]​ I would then prefer to interpret the process of embedding that Bartelborth described above as showing that E is an instance of a law of nature and it is this unification that I take to be explanatory. E being 'unified' together with all the other instances that fall under the laws in question.  I will make some brief comments on this proposal. First of all, by interpretating theoretical functions realistically means that they are to understood in the same way as non-theoretical functions as designating real properties of physical objects, properties, or rather quantities, that they have in re. In the post-empircist era of philosophy of science, this is no longer a controversial position. It does not follow, however, that every theoretical function be interpreted realistically in order for there to be any explanation. It may turn out, though not I think in the two examples considered here, that we might have reservations about regarding some such functions as designating real quantities. However, provided that at least one T-theoretical function is interpreted realistically, then T showing how values of this functions are related to those of the explanandum E can provide the basis for explanation. 

A more important question, given my criticism of other viewpoints, is what justifies all this: why it that interpreting theoretical functions realistically and introducing laws of nature gives the kind of unification that is genuinely explanatory? The answer that I would now give to this question is in terms of the idea that laws of nature are relations of natural necessity between quantities. I am now convinced by the arguments of Armstrong and others that such a conception of laws of nature is needed if laws are to perform all the roles that are attributed to them, such as support for counterfactuals (see Armstrong 1983). With regard to explanation, the idea of natural necessity has a part to play but it is not the whole story. Laws of nature are regarded as patterns in the world, lawful relations between quantities. It is in this aspect that the present view of explanation is seen to be a species of the ontic conception or category of explanation that Salmon identified thirty years ago. According to Salmon "[W]e might say that to explain an event is to exhibit it as occupying its (nomologically necessary) place in the discernible patterns of the world" (Salmon 1984: 18, original italics). This is, in my opinion, completely correct and an exemplary statement of the ontic conception, though I would interpolate "and states of affairs" after "event". 

The reason why exhibiting the place of events and states of affairs in discernible patterns, in laws of nature on my reading of the ontic conception, is not spurious systematisation is that it is those patterns which are of the right kind. Events and states of affairs are physical events and states of affairs, things in the world, and so to explain them must be to establish appropriate relations with other things in the world. Salmon thought that these relations must be exclusively causal, and that to explain something was to show its place in causal patterns. I am inclined to the view that causal patterns are all laws of nature, but that the converse is not true, and so there will be lawful patterns that are not causal. However, we can now distinguish lawful patterns from those mere constant conjunctions by appeal to the notion of natural necessity and maintain that genuine explanations only come about by incorporating explananda into lawful patterns. There is obviously more that can be said, both about the justification of the ontic conception and the idea of laws as relations of natural necessity (and Salmon, Armstrong and others have said a good deal more), but for present purposes enough has been done to see how to rebut the objection that embeddings into models is spurious systematisation when it is understood to be done to show that states of affairs fall under laws of nature. 









^1	  I say here "for instance" because in recent years there have been proposals to use category theory as the means for reconstruction. In the early days, however, when Sneed wrote his brilliant and revolutionary The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics (Sneed 1971),and before the name "Structuralism" had currency, use of informal set-theory was a defining characteristic.
^2	  Consistency and completeness are not the focus of attention when it comes to applications of those theories, for instance the application of arithmetic in measurement. Thus, in the three volumes of Foundations of Measurement (Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky, 1971, 1989, 1990) a central concern is with representation and uniqueness theorems.
^3	  Until, in my view, the publication of Sneed 1971.
^4	  We might have some reservations about including A as an element of K for the following reason. As Moulines points out, entirely correctly, actual applications of K will often involve various errors and approximations, for example owing to errors of measurement – a topic that has been greatly clarified by Moulines' use of the topological concept of a blur as a way to understand the notion of  'closeness' of models. However, the acceptability of errors of measurement, just how big they are allowed to be, is surely an historical matter. Thus if an observed and a calculated value of a variable were considered 'close enough' ten years ago for the latter to explain the former, we might expect this to be no longer the case today, with improvements in measurement technology and hence more stringent standards of precision. This means that we should expect a 'narrowing' of the set A.. My point, then, is that the object A is 'historical' in a sense in which other elements of K are not. I mention all this in an endnote, as it will not inform the balance of my discussion.
^5	  These matters are discussed at length in Hempel's Aspects of Scientific Explanation. There have been many criticism thereof. See, for instance, Salmon's essay (Salmon 1989) on the development of our ideas on explanation from the publication of Hempel's first account of the D-N model.
^6	  Sneed's paper, Sneed 1994, contains a sentence in the abstract beginning "This paper generalizes (and somewhat simplifies) the work of Forge...". It does so by explicating the notion of something being a part of a model, reflecting my idea that to explain is to show that something is an instance or part of an instance of a law. Sneed's paper is certainly very interesting (and meets with the approval of Suppes who commented on it) but it does not dwell on the justification of the overall position which he (implicitly) accepts. This is clearly some version of the idea that to explain is to show that something is part of some whole, namely the explanation as unification approach. I should also refer here to a paper by Sintonen (Sintonen 1996) who mentions explanation in the course of a discussion of 'structuralism and the interrogative model of inquiry'. Thus, in Section 8 of his paper, he raises the issue of explanation as answers to why questions. It can hardly be denied that we can think of explanations as answers to such questions, though that realisation does not itself provide us with any account or analysis of explanation. A complete interrogative model of inquiry, one that covered such why questions, would, it seems, do so. Sintonen concedes that such a model is not yet available and also says that his 'erotetic view' seems to be consistent with several, apparently distinct, conceptions of explanation (Sintonen 1996: 68). My own view is that we need to fix our conception of explanation – ontic, epistemic, modal, etc. – before we try to develop a complete interrogative model of inquiry.
^7	  Dowe 2000 is the latest, at the time of writing.
^8	  In Salmon's later work, the emphasis was on mechanistic explanation, where a mechanism was understood to be the causal processes, common causes, interactive forks, etc., that gave rise to a state of affairs. A recent proposal, by Machamer et al., is for a 'mechanisms approach' to explanation that does not construe mechanisms in causal terms. 
^9	  Salmon has now conceded that there are other kinds of scientific explanation,  besides the causal-mechanistic, after a sustained attempt at maintaining that it was the only kind. See his concession to the unification approach in Salmon, 1989: 182. A word of clarification here on the terminology I am using. By a "kind" of explanation I mean a collection of examples of existing scientific explanations. Thus to say that "causal-mechanistic" designates a kind of explanation is to say that there are in fact such things in science. An approach to scientific explanation, as I think it is used by Bartelborth, is a way of framing an account of scientific explanation such as philosophers give, in order to 'explain' various kinds of scientific explanation. There can, for instance, be various causal accounts, deductivist accounts, etc. An account of explanation should contain a justification or rationale which substantiates the claim that what is identified as an explanation does indeed truly explain. One important advance made by Salmon over the previous accounts of causal explanation was that his ontology was able to support his claim that providing mechanisms was really explanatory.
^10	  Which is not something that Sneed was willing to commit himself to in the early days, but we don't have to agree with him there. However, it is worth noting that those who subscribe to causal theories of explanation tend to argue that realism about things like forces is a precondition for anyone who sees theories as having an explanatory role and not merely something that causal theorist must be  committed to. The unificationists may disagree.
^11	  We do, of course, find causal explanations in the other great theory of classical physics, electrodynamics. The fact that the electric and magnetic fields, the causes identified by the theory, are classified as theoretical functions provides further evident in support of the conjecture. 
^12	  I have also criticised Kitcher's proposal to use general argument patterns as a way to address this problem, see Forge 1993.
^13	  For example, in Forge 1990. Bartelborth refers to two older papers of mine in which I introduced the so-called instance view of explanation, that to explain is to show that something is an instance of a law of nature. The instance view is elaborated in Forge 1999.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